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[music] Netscape is, of course, known for
it's Netscape Navigator product, first

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commerical browser on the web.
So first tool.

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First generation really used to get on the
web and that was successful for a while.

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And then competition became quite stiff
from Microsoft.

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The different way to compete by building a
shared asset.

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Instead of Netscape versus Microsoft.
That Netscape would gather contributions

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of volunteers and other commercial part,
commercial partners, and then build the

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product that would be shared.
And that group of people knew that to be

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open source, you have to be real.
You couldn't just say, oh, we are open

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source, love us.
You really had to manage it differently.

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So at the time there was six or seven or
eight of us who were employed by Netscape,

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as Mozilla.org staff.
And another 100 or 150 employed by

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Netscape as Netscape engineers, building
the Netscape product.

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And contributing their work to the Mozilla
open source project.

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So we were all in the same buildings.
We all went to many of the same meetings.

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But we had slightly different goals.
Because although we call it the Netscape

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product, Netscape had been purchased by
AOL already.

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And so the client itself was diminishing
in importance, and the importance of the

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Netscape client was to push traffic to the
AOL websites.

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But we, of course, at mozilla.org were an
anomaly.

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Because our charter was to build a
successful open source project.

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And so, that worked for quite a while.
You know, there, there were tensions.

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You know?
These were the dark years for Mozilla.

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We came to understand we needed to rebuild
our core technology.

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That took a long time.
While we were doing that, market share

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continued to slide.
And there was a set of tensions over what

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does it mean to run a real open-source
project.

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And as it turned out, there were two
competing views.

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One view was that Open source is
phenomenal, we're very happy that the code

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is out there.
Everyone is very welcome to take it and

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use it.
We absolutely want to build a large and

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engaged contributor community.
But all decisions and all authority will

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be held by the management group and we'll
make those decisions as we think best,

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which is of course...
To benefit the client we're trying to

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build which was the Netscape browser.
We at Mozilla.org were convinced it

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wouldn't be successful, that, building a
product to benefit AOL only wouldn't

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generate the kind of interest either from
individual volunteers or from commercial

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partners that we needed to be successful.
And that we found the difference in

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perspective from the volunteers made the
quality of the project much higher.

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They were under immense pressure to ship
this product because the company needed

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it.
And not only was it difficult technically

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and in an engineering sense But we at
misoula.org were saying, and there's these

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other things, right?
You may think it's good enough, but we're

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telling you it's not because this is the
feedback that we're getting.

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And you need to change some of the
development processes and management

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practices.
And so they thought well, I, I'm not sure

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what they thought.
But we experienced it as No, we really

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need to keep going on the way that we're
going till we get this product shipped.

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But unfortunately, here the Mozilla
community was correct because when that

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product shipped it was a failure.
That we Netscape 6.

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Universally acknowledged as a bad product
and pretty universally acknowledged as the

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end of the Netscape product line.
You know there are all those people that

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had held on and hoped through the Nestcape
four days and waited and waited and waited

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for.
For the update once they got it pretty

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much gave up.
So that's what we experienced.

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So that certainly didn't help us, that was
unfortunate.

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It did reinforce our view that, you know
our view of the world wasn't crazy.

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And, so we continued on and it was still
long and slow to get technology and

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product that we liked.
And the tensions continued.

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The management tensions continued.
You know, the failure of Netscape 6 didn't

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make anything easier.
And certainly, for the, the AOL folks, it

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really didn't make things easier either.
And we fought a lot about the UI.

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I think UIs a constant source of tension.
But in our case, it was worse.

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Because some of these fights would be.
It makes sense to AOL to put something in

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the product.
In the interface of the product.

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Either a button to an AOL site.
Or something that has an ad in it.

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Or, some feature that a partner has paid
for.

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So it generates revenue.
We think it might send people to our site.

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You know, some of our users might really
like it.

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So it all made sense from their point of
view, but if you're not building the AOL

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client to benefit AOL, then you're trying
to build an open-source product that is

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used for many people.
Then, of course, those features are a big

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negative.
And so those were very fierce fights,

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because, because the management of the
client group had very clear opportunities

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in hand that they wanted to build into
their product.

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And we were this small group saying no.
>> You were diametrically opposed.

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>> We were pretty opposed in that case,
and we would say no, you can't put it into

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the quarter product.
You're welcome to have a build system on

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your own and add it in later.
And that's how we ended up doing this

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thing.
So we, so we did develop a system for it.

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But it was, of course, it's awkward.
And you're always rubbing against what

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should go where.
And it turned out, even in the very early

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days, that the open source Mozilla
versions of the product got a lot more

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testing than the Netscape versions.
And we also tried to build in some.

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Quality mechanisms that again, seem normal
today.

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So you can't you get hired as an employee,
you don't automatically get the right to

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check your code into the tree.
But someone has to look at your

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qualifications and say, at Mozilla and the
way we work Your coding level we

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understand.
You know how we work, we understand if

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something goes wrong with your code, you
know where you need to be and all of these

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things.
And that's a very difficult setting for a

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hiring manager to say, well I've just
hired you, and you can't be as efficient

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as you think you can because there's yet
another vetting process by this other

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group.
So I understand, yeah, why it was

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difficult, but on the other hand as an
open source project, if you can't control

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the quality of the code and you don't have
any say in it.

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You're not very real.
Aol client fortunes declined and the

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Netscape browser declined and declined
precipitously after this, Netscape 6.

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And so AOL was interested in laying off
people and in 1 of the big layoffs, I was.

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And that was, see, that was in 2001.
And that was seen as a power struggle as

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well.
Because by that time.

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The fights back and forth about what we
were building and who was making decisions

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were pretty well-known within the
engineering organizations.

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It's hard for them not to be.
I mean, it's true anywhere, right, but,

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but in some cases the fights and the bugs
are all very public as well.

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But, and, and so, so I was laid off Fired,
depending on your, you know, how you want

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to describe it.
And as it turned out, it wasn't really

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possible to take my place and I continued
as a volunteer and the Netscape

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Engineering Organization was very clear
whose leadership they were most interested

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in following.
And so [laugh] we had to work out a way in

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which the management had Netscape AOL that
remained.

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And I worked out a, you know, sort of a
way to worked together enough, so that

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they could ship the product they wanted to
ship.

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But that I continued to lead the project.
And I think that was a surprise not, not

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so much to me.
I, I, I think and, and so I worked as a

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volunteer on the Mozilla project and for a
number of years including the years in

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which we shipped our first product which
we called Mozilla and which we're very

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proud of technically and for it's day,
many people are surprised just how good it

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was but it didn't have a good user
Experience.

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But eventually I ended up working on
another open source project with Mitch

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Kapor for a while.
And that was mucky.

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He started this open project and reached
out to talk to Brendan and I About it to

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learn something.
And the day that he was scheduled to come

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down and talk with us was the day that I
was laid-off.

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>> And so it, it was an odd sort of
timing.Chandler Investment, by any

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chance?Yeah, that was Chandler.
That was pre-Chandler, but it was So I, I

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worked on that for a while.
And, and Mitch was always a supporter of

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Mozilla.
Even before Firefox, when he didn't like

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the product.
But he recognized that we were an

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important part of the ecosystem.
And that went on until 2003 when AOL

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decided to stop investing in a client
almost completely and, fortunately, they

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knew that just killing it wasn't good.
They knew nothing about Mozilla and the

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name and the brand to think it would be
good to do something with it.

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And, so eventually I ended up working with
them, and, and they, some of the people

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there knew Mitch as well.
And I was working with Mitch, and they

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knew him, and so we all, you know, spent a
chunk of time trying to figure out what

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was possible.
And my partner Brendan was still at

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Netscape.
There either to make a move and many of

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the key people we wanted were also
desperate, to keep working in almost over

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and so ended up getting a 2 million dollar
seed money for my aol and image yourself

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over that and few other things, trademark,
name of Zuilla and the 4 giant servers

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which were so important to us at the time
and would have taken almost 18 months to

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get.
Through the purchase cycle at AOL.

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And so I think we still have those boxes
sitting around, because they were so

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important to us at the time.
And so in 2003 the Misola foundation was

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formed.
And Mitch was the first chairman because

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he had done so much and had so much to
offer.

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And Brian Belendorff and, and Chris
Blizzard, worked on Mozilla forever and

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Brenda and I were on the board.
And AOL understood that there were three

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or four people that would be leaving, when
they, they did some kind of re-org or when

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they closed down the client group.
And that those people would be coming to

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join us or and, of all the people that we
thought would be most helpful at Mozilla,

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they all came.
That was about nine or ten.

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So we were, and Mitch continued to support
me, and, one other person in Mozilla part

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time.
So maybe 10 or 11 people.

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And I, and Brendan and I had always felt
that we needed employees.

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It was exciting, a little scary because we
knew that too many knowledge wouldn't go

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that far, and that we had a lot of work to
do to make ourselves real.

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We were still 18 months away from
shipping, well 15 months away from

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shipping Firefox.
So that part was scary.

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But it was immensely exciting.
One of the friends of Mozilla showed up,

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and they had a big lease, and a little bit
of space they could sublease to us.

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So we found a funky little room, way in
the back, not even a sink.

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[laugh] Very odd, but, but we were really
happy with it.

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And we worked away on building our
product.

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At that time, we made what was a pretty
fundamental change that was critical, and

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we decided unambiguously it'd be a
consumer product.

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That seems obvious, but when you have a
bunch of developers it's not that easy,

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and it means that you have to strip-out a
lot of the, things that are clunky, for a

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general consumer.
You really have to be determined.

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That you're building for a general
consumer, not yourself.

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And I think many open source projects
probably don't want to do that and

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shouldn't try if you don't want to,
because you have to keep at it.

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So we started doing that.
Out of the blue, some visual designers

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appeared from Centre Island in Canada and
so we started to get nice looking logos,

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which we'd never had before and visual
elements and then we tried to figure out

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what to do with the start page, because we
knew that Mozilla development tools

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weren't the right answer and we just, took
us for ever and we looked at all sorts of

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things and finally decided.
The one thing we knew that everybody did

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was search.
You know we have people who say well it's

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obvious you should have the BBC, at least
an english language version.

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It's obvious.
And then you know our engineering guy

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would look up and say well it's not
obvious to my 17 year old daughter that

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that's what she wants.
It's not obvious to my son either.

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So, but everybody used search.
So we thought we have the search box.

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Maybe we should put that on a start page
to make it easier maybe it be more obvious

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to people about search.
So we went to talk with the search

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providers we had very fruitful discussion
with Google I think they also saw the

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value of having Mozilla browser in the
world they were very explicit about that

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and I believe them.
And so, they're also open to doing, a

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business arrangement.
And so often people ask, how Mozilla gets

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paid, and we're like most businesses on
the web, searc-, search and ads.

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You do a search, you know you'll see ads,
if you follow those ads, revenue is

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generated, you know it goes through the
system and we get a little piece of As do

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other browser makers.
So it's very similar to the business model

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on the web.
And we did something that I believe had

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never been done before, which was to make
sure that Google and Yahoo were right

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there next to each other.
I, you don't see them next to each other.

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You have to click on the arrow, but
they're there.

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And today people laugh at me when, when I
say that, because you only see one, but,

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but I negotiated that, and that was an
absolute.

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Either I will walk away from the deal,
term, to everyone.

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But I don't think I'd ever seen it before.
And I wasn't.

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You know as you get on a plane and you
want a Diet Coke, but the plane only has

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diet Pepsi, because that's their deal,
you're angry, and you don't want a Diet

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Pepsi and you want a Coke.
And I, I used that example.

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I said, I'm not going to have Firefox
users angry at us because they wanted one

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or the other.
You know, you have to agree you're both

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going to be in the product.
>> But it also is your values, right?

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It is.
>> Yes.

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>> Your values front and center.
>> Yes, because the choice is there.

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We can do it.
And, and to not do it would be to take

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away a choice that somebody really wants.
And it matters to someone, so.

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So we, we have a choice in the search box.
But we still didn't really know what to

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expect.
So we shipped Firefox.

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And our sense that we were onto something
turned out to be far more true, even than

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we knew.
We had seen a, you know, rise in interest

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from 0.8 and 0.9 that was pretty
noticeable but once we hit the release

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version it just exploded.
And part of that was it was just the

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perfect product.
This time we had products at the right

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time in the market.
And then internet capabilities have grown

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and now people could actually download a
browser easily, and more people had

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bandwidths and ability to do so and a
comfort level to try it.

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So that was good, for we had a beautiful
product, and it was an important product.

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And the alternative was horrendous and
dangerous and awful.

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And so, all of that combined to create
this giant excitement.

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And so Firefox market share climbed by,
you know, a percentage point immediately

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and started moving in these huge numbers.
So there was a completely viral storm with

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nothing driving it other than, you know,
the product and the need, so, so that took

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everyone by surprise.
You know, we were hoping to be able to

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generate a few million dollars to support
ourselves for the next year.

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You know, we had 10 or 11 employees; you
start to add that up, so we were hoping to

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make enough money to do that.
And it turned out, you know, we generated

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that amount of money before the end of the
year.

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Six weeks or eight weeks or whatever it
was before the end of the year.

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And so, things, actually things got even
more stressful and more hectic at that

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point.
Because now you kind of got the proverbial

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tiger by the tail.
We're still 12 people.

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Right, so that immediate need to grow and
that sense of pressure and stress combined

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with elation and success is probably, you
know I don't know maybe it's like having a

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child.
Right, but it's that, it's that

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combination doesn't immediately get
easier.

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>> It's a little easier to be anonymous.
>> Yes, yes.

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>> You're nervous.
>> Yes, But yes, that's for sure.

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We certainly see that, and so by the end
of first half of 2004, just actually, we

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just passed the 8 year anniversary.
And you know, by the end of 2004, it was

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pretty clear that we were a different
organization.

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We were, we were I would say still
struggling with a different set of

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problems but we had changed the nature of
the problems really quite fundamentally.

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And, you know we'd done so in a way that,
that our users loved.

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By 2005 we were in a really different
world, where.

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We began to be able to actually influence
others and that's always been the goal.

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I mean, market share is nice and it's nice
when people love your product.

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Market share is a validation that you
produced the right thing, so that's

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awesome on it's own.
But the more important, I would say not

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more important, equally important goal is
to be able to influence not only

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ourselves, but others in the industry so
that we start to see more of the things

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that we care about.
[music]