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University of Michigan was one of the
organizations That made a proposal for a

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national supercomputing center. That
Proposal was made just as I arrived at the

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University of Michigan at the beginning of
1985. The Michigan proposal had as a, as

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its primary hardware artifact a machine
that was built in Japan. And I explained

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to my colleagues, my new colleagues, the
University of Michigan having just

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arrived, that it was highly unlikely that
the proposal would be funded because I

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didn't think, especially in that period
that a Japanese machine would, would make

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it past the review process ion he National
Science Foundation. A short while later, I

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was visiting the National Science
Foundation and I had gotten to know, not

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well, but had gotten to know Eric Locke,
who was then director of the National

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Science Foundation. And Eric and I had a
conversation about Michigan's proposal.

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And it was clear to me from my
conversation with Eric that there was no

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prospect that the Michigan proposal would
be funded. I said to Eric, I said, well,

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it occurs to me that what might be even
better for the University of Michigan than

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having a supercomputing center, is to run
the network that connects all of the

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supercomputing centers together. A while
later, there was a proposal request for

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proposals on that network, which later
became known as the National Science

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Foundation Network. Yeah, that came I have
become the chairman of the board at

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Merritt which is Michigan state wide
network. Merritt had, over the years, in

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parallel with the packet switching,
protocol developments that had been

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involved in the Arpanet, had developed its
own packet switching network and, so we

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knew that the NSF had in mind, a project
that would last about five years and would

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in total, require the expenditure of
$15,000,000. As we went through thinking

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about how we'd create this proposal, we
realized very rapidly that $15,000,000

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would only fund a 56 kilo bit network
which, it was very clear, if it were even

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put in place, would rapidly become
overwhelmed by the traffic. And so we

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immediately started thinking, well, how
could we expand the envelope for such a

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proposal? So I got in touch with Jamie and
said, you know we have this NSF Med

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opportunity and we're gonna try to bring
in this [inaudible] into this, would the

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state be interested? And Jamie said yes,
get back to me when you sort of fit the

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pieces together. Then we went to the IBM
corporation. Because even though IBM, very

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much like Merritt didn't have a lot of
credentials in Internet protocol work,

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they are a big corporation with lots of
cabibility in building uh-huh,

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communications equipment. I had an old
friend who worked for IBM research by the

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name of Al Lise. Who's in charge of all of
IBM researches computing facilities, and

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I've called Al. And I said Al, this is a
great opportunity, but IBM is going to is,

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is not going to be successful here. And I
need your help. And so l sort of rallied

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some folks from IBM research, where there
actually was work going on in TCIP

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Protocols. And so forth and we had another
meeting. I managed to drag Hans Verner out

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to another meeting with IBM and, and Hans
Verner admitted, at the end of that

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meeting there are people in IBM that know
something about this and yes, they could

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be partners. So, we got tentatively an
agreement from IBM that they would

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contribute the hardware and the software
to create the routing structure for the

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network. But we still needed the
communications facilities. And at that

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time, the CFO at IBM was a gentleman. I
think I remember the name correctly by,

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his last name was Crow. And, so through
IBM, we went to him and he had contacts

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with a former IBM employee who is now the,
network, the chief technical officer, and

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essentially the chief network operations
officer for MCI. His name was Dick

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[inaudible]. And so IBM approache d Dick
[inaudible], asked him if MCI would be

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interested in providing the communications
facilities for this network. Well, as you

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may recall at that time, MCI was this
fledgling organization. Some people would

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describe it really as, as a law office,
trying to create an environment where they

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can actually offer telecommunication
services up against AT&T's lobbying

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efforts. They, they have just been
successful in that they were establishing

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facilities across the United States and,
and Dick [inaudible] saw this as an

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opportunity to sort of move MCI into the
big time. To be part of this NSF net

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proposal. And so we wound up with an
agreement, that we would file a joint

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proposal with Merritt as the principal
organization. In partnership with IBM, who

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had built all the routing hardware and
software and with NCI, who would provide

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the nationwide communications facilities.
And while we were and, then we got

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Governor Blanchard to commit a million
dollars a year from state funds, in

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addition. So we wound up being able to
submit a proposal to the National Science

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Foundation I think for something like 14.7
million dollars, because we knew the

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sealing was fifteen. But in fact by
including all this in kind activity, it

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was actually more like a $55,000,000
proposal and it wasn't. Designed to be 56

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kilobits. It was designed to start at T1
or 1.5 megabits. With planned upgrades

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over the, over the period of the network,
networks live. We've subsequently learned

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that the proposal was received with
considerable skepticism by the reviewers

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of the National Science Foundation because
Merritt did not have a strong history in

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TCP IP and IBM was thought was the enemy
of the internet, it was then focused on

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its own propitiatory protocols and, and so
people really wondered about our technical

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ability to pull this off, but the, that
review was conducted without reference to

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the actual funding pattern. And then when
the wraps got pulled off of the amount of

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resou rce that was being committed by the
partners to this proposal, it immediately

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went to the top of the list at the NSF,
and. And I think we always had a notion

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that it could be a big deal. We didn't
know for sure, because from the time that

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we turned this network on, in 88 until
about 1994, the network traffic, the

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number of hosts on the network, all of
this grew by, at the rate of about fifteen

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percent a month. So this, this net. This,
this network literally exploded underneath

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us. And we were extremely fortunate that
the protocol suite, the TCP IP Protocol

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Suite and the fundamental notions of the
network. Allowed it. To grow at that rate.

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And, but we had to do a lot of innovation.
The border gateway protocols had to be

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developed to allow multiple networks to
interact with one another. And we have to

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build increasingly more capable routing
and communications facilities. Finally in.

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I think it was around 1990 this network
was growing so fast that it was clear that

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these T1 circuits were not going to, were
not going to enable what we needed to do.

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So we had to go to the next step which was
DS3 or from 1-1/2 megabits to 45 megabits,

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which was a very large step, a 30 fold
increase in capacity. And, in order to do

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that, we, wound up creating another, not
for profit organization called Advanced

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Network and Services. Merritt was still
the principal investigator on the grant.

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But it subcontracted, the development of,
this new network, this 45, megabit network

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to Advanced Network and Services, which
was headquartered in Armonk . The NSF net

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was the fastest internet, network to the
end. It finally was the commissioned in,

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1995, when the congress decided that the
Federal government should not be in the

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business of supporting something, that by
that time, in their view, should have

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been, become a commercial facility. I'll
not ever forget sitting in a house hearing

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room in the capitol. And next to Mitch
Kapor and some Internet some small

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internet company, start up CEOs who were
complaining, to the congress that it was

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inappropriate for, the NSF net to be
funded by, by the National Science

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Foundation when they could provide the
service, as a commercial service. At the

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very same time they were making that
complaint, they were using NSF net as,

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their, backup network, to carry traffic,
when their much less reliable networks

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failed on a national scale. Mci of course
turned out to be a major Internet Service

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Provider also using the same technology.
In a classic innovator's curse moment, IBM

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who was at that time the leader in routing
technology for, internet for internet

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backbones, managed to decide that they
should kill all of the work they have done

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in developing these routers because it
would threaten their proprietary network

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efforts. It's probably almost single
handedly responsible for the fact that

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Cisco became the dominant router, company
in the United States rather than IBM.
